We extend a sociophysics model of two-group conflict dynamics to three groups.
critique refers chiefly to the lack of precise, broadly accepted definitions for social variables of interest, unlike in physics, as well as lack of sufficient numbers of similar cases to afford generalizations and reliable predictions. Indeed, although both physical and social systems are complex and display emergent behaviors, unlike physical particles humans do not follow predictable rules, such that given the same conditions the same results obtain. Bernstein et al. (2000) 8 described how molecules differ from people for prediction purposes. Their critique is apt for attempts, as Stewart (1950) 27 had proposed, to predict social behaviors using physics methods despite these differences.
Sociophysics models, however, do not necessarily seek prediction in the same sense as social models. Rather, by using physics analogies, they help capture patterns and trajectories of complex social systems, yielding a range of future possibilities that decision makers in a particular situation need to take into account as they prepare strategies. While discouraging the use of physics models for social theory building and making point predictions, Bernstein et al. 's (2000) statement that 8 , "Knowledge of structure and process also allows conscious and far-reaching transformations of social systems" supports the use of such models in efforts to understand interactive systems in order to intervene and change course when necessary.
Statistical physics models of social systems with a large number of members, each interacting with a subset of others, have been used in very diverse domains such as culture dynamics, crowd behavior, information dissemination 22 and social conflicts 11? ,12 . Buchanan (2007) 28 observed that such models rely on the fact that large societal groups display surprising regularities despite individual agency. In response to the critique of oversimplification of social dynamics when representing them with statistical physics tools, Castellano et al.
(2000) 22 note that "in most situations qualitative (and sometimes quantitative) properties of large scale phenomena do not depend on the microscopic details of the process. Only higher level features, such as symmetries, dimensionality or conservation laws, are relevant for the global behavior." 29 Thus, it is not necessary to assume that humans behave mechanistically, which is a critique frequently leveled at sociophysics models.
In this article, we illustrate the utility of sociophysics to the study of intractable social conflicts by considering the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the site of long-standing conflicts (e.g., Friedman 2013 38 ). In the next section we extend to three groups the Diep et al. (2017) model 11 of two groups in conflict. In Section III, we describe the three groups in the BiH conflict, which has flared up again ahead of 2018 presidential elections. In Sections IV and V we report results of our model applied to the BiH situation, using the mean-field approach for long-range interactions, and Monte Carlo simulations for short-range interactions. Section VI is a qualitative discussion of the model results in general and for the BiH conflict.In Section VII we offer concluding remarks.
II. THE MODEL
We assume, as in the two-group model 11 , that in each of three disputing groups each individual has a preference or attitude s, such that −M n ≤ s ≤ M n (n=1, 2, 3), regarding whether or not to engage with the other group to resolve the conflict. Individuals whose attitudes s = −M n or close to it are the most open to compromise, being only very loosely attached to their group's identity or ideology. Those with attitudes around M n stick to their goals to the point of confrontation if necessary, due to strong adherence to their own group's ideology, and willingness to defend it by any means. This attitude leads to opposition to concessions. The 0 midpoint of this range represents adherence to the values of one's group, combined with willingness to find a way out of the conflict with the opposing groups.
As in the two-group model, we also assume that each group is a network of members interacting with each other. This linkage pattern among members of a group based on some shared characteristics is called homophily (see McPherson et al. 30 and Aiello et al. 31 ). In the words of McPherson et al., "similarity breeds connection". The networks can interact with each other, forming a multiplex. Within each group, each individual acts with a certain intensity to persuade others to his/her point of view, and is in turn subject to others' persuasion efforts. In any group, the individuals' stances are also affected indirectly by the "average" stances of the other groups.
The three-group model yields group preference averages s n (n = 1, 2, 3) at any time t, which result from the members' intra-group mutual interactions, and consideration of the average attitudes of opposing groups. The intra-group intensity of advocacy (which we conceptualize as negative energy) of an individual from group n is J n * s * s n , where s n is the average of all individual preferences in group n. When an individual's stance is affected by another group, the inter-group intensity of interaction (negative energy) is taken to be proportional to the product between that individual's preference s and the mean value of the preferences of the other groups' members. For example, for an individual in group 1:
, where K 1j (j = 2, 3) captures the individual's reaction to the average attitudes in groups 2 and 3.
The two-group model 11 had 4 parameters (2 J s and 2 K s ); for three-group there are 9 parameters (3 J s and 6 K s ), and in general an n−group model will have n 2 parameters (n J s and n 2 − n K s ), rapidly increasing the levels of computational and representation difficulty.
However, useful insights can be derived from the n = 3 model. 32 , the matrix of inter-group interactions is not necessarily symmetrical:
Unlike in physics
K mn = K nm because of human agency. While physics phenomena obey Newton's third law,the magnitudes of human action and reaction do not have to be equal. Rather, the effect of group n on group m can be different in magnitude and sign from the effect group m has on group n. When K mn and K nm have opposite signs a "frustration-like" effect emerges: a positive s m induces a negative s value in group n because of negativity of K nm ; a negative s n induces negative s value in group m because of positivity of K mn .Thus while group n acts on group m positively, eliciting a "tit-for-tat" response in the latter (similar values of the corresponding attitudes), group m may act on group n negatively, eliciting "contrarian" responses.
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A temperature, reflecting contextual factors and quantified in the model by means of the Boltzmann probability distribution, drives the variability in individual preferences s in a group. Our dynamic model captures the evolution of group preferences by assuming that the intensity of interactions involves the product of individuals' preferences at a current time and average preferences of opposing groups at an earlier time. This lag reasonably reflects the fact that results of individuals' persuasion efforts in one time period are likely to materialize in a later time period.
As in the two-group model, we study the three-group multiplex first using a mean-field A survey of attitudes among the BiH population (Prism 2013 40 ) brings out some of the issues currently fueling conflicts both between the three ethnic groups and with the government (see a summary of some of the issues in Table 1 ). Among the biggest reasons for dissatisfaction, 72% cited corruption, followed by the economy and the politics (59 and 51% respectively) and the government's performance (27%). Only 10% of respondents said that relations with people from another ethnic group were problematic. Perhaps this is because
BiH is highly segregated: most respondents reported living in areas where their ethnic group is dominant (with few wishing it were different), so there may be few encounters with people from the other groups.The percentage of respondents proud of their ethnic identity (93%)
roughly matched the percentage with pride in religious identity, and 88% were proud of their regional identity (the three identities greatly overlap) while only 73% felt proud of being BiH citizens. Serbs felt least attached to BiH (at 47%) and Bosniaks most (at 91%). This indicates the three groups are homophilic and the union is not stable yet.
The respondents' prediction of a new armed conflict within 5 years has been correct:
only one third thought it very or somewhat likely, with the Serbs least pessimistic (42% thought armed conflict unlikely by 2018). Should BiH break apart, only 38% expected it to happen peacefully, with 59% skeptical of this possibility. Half of respondents also wished to separate their (national/ethnic) territory from BiH. With their own Republika Srpska, Serbs were least interested in this possibility and half of them were disengaged, while Bosniaks and Croats expressed more readinesss to take arms to defend their territory.
BiH respondents mostly concurred that the government, politicians and the international community were most responsible for their problems. These contextual factors driving dissatisfaction correspond to temperature in our model. The respondents holding the context repsonsible may account for their relatively high reported levels of apathy; only about 50% are prepared to participate in the elections, with Bosniaks at the lowest level (46%) and
Croats highest at 66%. Slightly more than a third of the population would like to leave BiH.
Most predicted no change in the political arrangement among the three groups, but if they could have their wishes only about one third of FB&H and only a quarter of Serbs would keep this arrangement. Half of the Serb respondents preferred an independent RS. Almost no one expressed interest in Serbs joining Greater Serbia or Croats joining Greater Croatia.
40% of respondents (with 60% of Bosniaks) felt that eventually the ethnic entities FB&H and RS should be abolished in favor of one Bosnia.
The underlying latent ethnic conflict is ever-present despite the seeming apathy. About 30% of respondents believe they need to reach consensus around a common truth about the past in order to move forward. However only about 13% think they should discuss their past grievances, or believe reconciliation is possible or important; only 12% agree that they should ignore past grievances and focus on the future. Reconciliation is not for tomorrow:
only 40% believed in 2013 that it would happen in 5 to 10 years, with Croats most optimistic at 63% and Serbs most pessimistic at 28%. if the other two groups are rather conciliatory, Bosniaks may find the space to defend their interests more aggressively. To capture these kinds of reactions we assume that K 12 < 0, interactions.
We show next mean-field and Monte Carlo simulation approaces results for the BiH case.
IV. MEAN-FIELD APPROACH

A. Equations
The Renyi-Erdøs network corresponds to our homophily assumptions about how the individuals in the three BiH groups interact with each other. The mean of preferences s of each group is proportional to the exponential of the intensity of interactions (negative energy):
s 3 (t + 1) = 
where j n = J n /T and k n,m = K n,m /T for n,m = 1, 2 , 3. We use units such that k B = 1.
We introduce the lag time in equations (1) Equations 1-3 can be written as: At high temperatures, representing a context that exacerbates the BiH situation, such as upcoming elections or international events affecting internal BiH affairs, the three groups' attitudes s converge to zero over time (see Fig. 2 ), with damped oscillations as function of time. In the three-dimensional space (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) a spiral trajectory in time converges to the origin,s 1 = s 2 = s 3 = 0. This is a disorder point where, for each group, all possible attitudes are equally probable, resulting in the zero average.
At lower temperatures T = 1.0 the oscillations are sustained and the three groups' attitudes are synchronized exhibiting the same period.(see Fig. 3 ). The trajectory in the (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) space evolves in the long run to a closed-loop attractor shown in Fig. 3 .
Lowering the temperatures increases the period of oscillations, and the closed-loop attractor begins to fragment (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 ).
We argue that the higher temperature attractor represents the essence of acute intractability: there is no single point at which the conflict settles, but rather a never-ending (nonsequential) cycling occurs among possible outcomes on the attractor. For (context-driven) lower temperatures the attractor fragments into a discreet number of fixed points. The system still cycles among them but the discrete configuration corresponds to a lower degree of intractability than the continuous attractor ( Fig. 2) : 
V. MODEL FOR MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
In this section, we use the same model as the mean-field (MF) model above, but we take into account only short-range intra-group interactions. Each individual in group n has a finite number of neighbors with whom he/she interacts. The intra-group Hamiltonian of group n is
where the sum is taken over nearest neighbors (NN) i and j belonging to group n, with interaction J n . For each group we use a triangular lattice network: each individual occupies a site having six NN with whom he/she interacts. The use of the triangular lattice allows us, when necessary, to introduce a percentage of intra-group frustration to take into account "rebel" attitudes of some individuals. We will come back to this point in the discussion.
We assume hereafter that all individuals have the same interaction J i with their neighbors.
The strength of J i (i = 1, 2, 3) gives each-group stability against perturbations from outside such as the social temperature in which the group is immersed, and the influence of the other groups.
For canonical MC simulations, we express the temperature T from the MF model ) 11 as follows
where k B is the Boltzmann constant to be set to 1 hereafter.
The simulation is carried out as follows: at a given set of J parameter values, we start by equilibrating each group without inter-group interaction. This is done with the standard then the probability of taking the state E 2 is almost zero. Conversely, if E 2 ≤ E 1 the change of his/her state always occurs. We achieve a MC step t by doing this for all individuals of the group. We repeat the steps numerous times until the equilibrium is reached (timeindependence of physical quantities).
An example is shown in Fig. 7 . We see that the social temperature T C , beyond which the stability of a group is lost, is not the same for three groups: the higher the intra-group interaction J, the higher T C threshold.
As in the MF calculation above, an individual in a given group interacts at the time t + 1 with the average of the action field created by the other groups at the earlier time t. The only difference from the MF calculation is the short-range interaction considered in the MC simulation. We will see that the results differ in some important aspects.
Once the equilibrium is reached for each group, we turn on the interactions between groups at time t. As described in section II, we calculate at time t the normalized "force" field of group J n acting on the other groups as where N n is the population of group n. An individual from group m at the time t + 1 interacts with his/her NN and with the group n at the earlier time t by −K mn s m (t + 1)h n (t) (12) where m = n. We calculate the strengths s n (n = 1, 2, 3) as functions of t, at a given T .
An example at low T is shown in Fig. 7 where the inter-group interactions may or not destroy the order of a group. We have chosen the interaction strengths and signs in the example below to illustrate the BiH case described in section III.
At higher T , the order of each group is weakened. The inter-group interactions cause the groups' stances to oscillate widely without periodicity as also seen in the long-range MF results above. We observe that at times the stronger group 2 dominates the other two. This pattern reflects the level of intractability of the three-group conflict simulated here, consistent with the longer-term MF results. While the conflict is intractable at all the temperatures of Figure 8 , at the lower temperature (corresponding to a stable context) the groups are 'stuck' in predictable ways (see Fig. 8a ); as the context gets heated, the three-group system cycles unpredictably through various stages (Fig. 8b and c) .
Let us show briefly in Fig. 9 the results when the number of intra-group individual states differs among groups. The diminution of Q causes a weaker intrinsic strength of the group as seen by the internal energies of Group 1 and 3 in Fig. 9a . At high T Groups 1 and 3 exhibit similar random oscillation, while the strong Group 2's domination is very pronounced as seen in Fig. 9b and c.
We have also examined the effect J i . Some differences in details are found but the overall random oscillation when 3 groups are at high T remains.
The effect of K ij has been investigated. Within small changes with respect to the values of K ij used in Fig. 7 do not change qualitatively the results. However, when the signs of K ij change, there are interesting changes in the long-time averages of the group strengths as seen in Fig. 10a . The short-time oscillating behavior on the other hand does not change. 
FIG. 9: Effect of number of states Q
1 = 2M 1 + 1 = 5, Q 2 = 2M 2 + 1 = 7, Q 3 = 2M 3 + 1 = 5, M 1 = 2, M 2 = 3,
VI. DISCUSSION
Our discussion of BiH conflict specifics and the insights for it derived with mean-field computations and Monte Carlo simulations is combined with discussion of some of the threegroup model's general features and implications for applying sociophysics to the analysis of social conflicts.
The application to BiH considered the three groups to be homophilic. We note that if a group is relatively small (as in the Serbs' case) assuming that each individual interacts with everyone else is not unreasonable, and the mean-field results describe this well. If a group is large (e.g. Bosniaks), interactions may be more localized (among neighbors) with a distance decay effect on mutual persuasion. The Monte Carlo results represent this situation, which can yield chaotic time series of the attitudes. Results of chaotic patterns are unpredictable except for extremely short time ranges.
In general with asymmetric and opposite-sign Ks (like BiH) the temperature effects (corresponding to the intensity with which the context affects the conflict) are as follows: at low temperatures, each group sticks to its own stance in time, with little or no effect of the inter-group influences; at high temperatures, the system becomes disordered, and all Interveners in conflicts can use the temperature results to strategize at a point in time (which is necessarily in a short time range, because the longer the time period considered, the more likely it is that parameters and context change): they may want to raise the temperature or lower it to defuse the conflict or even give it a push to agreement. However, altering the context (i.e. temperature) in a desired direction through intervention is a tall order. In reality, the kinds of actions intervenors can take correspond (in our model) to altering the J and K values in a conflict. Intractable conflicts require repeated interventions in time to change the system's path. Arguably, less external attention to, or pressure on the dynamics preceding the BiH elections might lower the temperature, but that is not necessarily in the interest of all the external players.
We note that for our choice of parameter values based loosely on the Prism survey,
the BiH conflict appears intractable in the long run at all temperatures (Figures 2 to 5 ).
Interveners and contextual events may alter the parameter values sufficiently to set it on a different course. Although additional analysis might surface the parameter values that might eventually yield settlement, it does not necessarily mean that we can attain them now through the right moves, since they result from a complex combination of future changes in parties and in their context.
Negotiation theory holds that qualitative differences between two and three parties in conflict exist due in part to an increase in process intricacies, to the possibility of coalitions and to the complexity of multiparty conflicts. Neither process nor coalition formation are directly captured by our model. Therefore, the two-and three-party models yield some qualitatively similar results. On the other hand, the increased level of complexity is reflected in the three-party model.
In the negotiation literature, some conflicts are discussed in terms of two main groups.
Examples include Democrats and Republicans in the US, North Korea and South Korea, or Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. However, more groups may be involved in each case and may affect outcomes in time, either directly or indirectly through the conflict context (conceptualized in our model as temperature). Ignoring such groups has practical consequences.
We may fail to make sense of observed outcomes and even resort to labeling the two disputing parties irrational to account for discrepancies between the observations and theory.
We may also offer wrong remedies. If the conflict dividing the Korean peninsula is framed as between only two parties, we relegate some key others such as China to the background (temperature), despite the fact that they may be actively driving the outcomes. Therefore, temperature captures external contextual effects, but it is useful to scrutinize them and identify components that constitute additional parties. At times, what seems to be a large temperature impact is due to the inclusion in the context of a group with large clout. In the BiH case, we might consider the European Union an influence group important enough to pull out of the temperature effect. In other words, the temperature should account for diffuse or ill-understood influences rather than actions of another major group. Although we described in detail a three-party version, the model can accommodate additional parties (at the computational cost of additional parameters).
Our model is tailored qualitatively to the BiH case through the choice of parameter values.
It can be tailored to other cases in the same way. This is an advantage and an important contribution. First, theory and practice indicate that few social conflict cases are sufficiently comparable; specifics make a sizeable difference, and there are never enough similar cases to allow derivation of more than very broad generalities. Second, since the model produces case-specific results, it avoids the mechanistic trap feared by Bernstein et al. (2000) ?
for sociophysics applications to social sciences. Instead, given a current starting point, it produces specific possible trajectories (or scenarios) for the consideration of stakeholders and interveners. In specific cases, however, the longer the time span, the less likely it is for the model parameters to remain unchanged, precisely because the conflict is dynamic, embedded in other changing systems, and subject to changing temperatures. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct sensitivity analyses on the choice of parameter values, 44 as well as reassess these values whenever data become available (for example, an opinion survey conducted along similar lines as Prism after the 2018 BiH elections).
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article we have expanded a two-group model of social conflict dynamics (Diep ANR-16-IDEX-0008). We thank the staff of the IAS for their hospitality.
